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It is a curious, if not downright odd, first thing to say about The Oddball Archive that, above all else, 
it has spoken to me at the level of politics. After all, particularly as it is practiced in the contemporary 
academy, politics or political science is a discipline famed for its ‘seriousness’; its social science 
predictive ways, its focus on institutions, structures of power and governance, and its avoidance of 
the messy stuff of culture, agency and desire. Could anything be less oddball; less hospitable to the 
playfulness of hoaxers and hoarders, or the incongruity of dissected fish and Dixie cups? What of the 
explorations at the limits of rationality, the flush of excitement at revelling in the irrational, and the 
constant, quite odd, slip between them both that The Oddball Archive performs so well?  
But politics it is! I say this because at the heart of The Oddball Archive I see a series of questions - no, 
a call-to-arms if you will - centred precisely on the politics of knowledge production; its practices, its 
objects, and our place as practitioners of and within it. What the uncanny, the heterogeneous, the 
curious and the downright odd do for us is show us the manifold ways in which knowledge 
formation is a deeply political act - all those streams of thought shut down as quaint, deluded or 
categorically dangerous blind alleyways of inquiry by the relentless monotheism of modern science 
historiography; all those states of being - ecstatic, fractious, excessive, divine - curtailed, shunned 
and ultimately disciplined, for being out-of-step with a dominant mode of knowledge production 
whose contemporary form can only countenance Being shackled to a notion of productivity; and all 
those ways in which things, objects, treasures and plain and simple ‘stuff’, are stripped of their 
ability to demand attention, circulate, resonate and coalesce within worlds and spheres of 
knowledge, reduced as they are to mere possessions of more ‘Enlightened’ beings. These are things 
which we have not just inherited as the way the world happens to be; these are things which are a 
reflection of the world we have produced - the acts of repression, the conquests and disciplinings; 
the hard-fought negotiations and compromises; the bigotries, fears and violences; as well as the 
more modest whims and fancies, forgetfulnesses and out and out dumb luck associated with how it 
is that something comes to stand as ‘known’. 
However, in getting lost in the curious collections of objects, places , words and temporalities of The 
Oddball Archive what we find is the way in which this collection - like all good collections - points not 
only to its own death, but also to the effervescence of its many possible afterlives. In the extremes 
of its near-misses, but more often than not, blistering successes, this archive of archives, odd and 
curious, furtively calls upon us to acknowledge and resist the ways in which our disciplinary trainings 
are just that - disciplining as much as they are enabling. It beckons to us as practitioners of 
knowledge production to perform and enact the archive rather than merely explicate its worth. And 
finally it calls to us to recognise the ways in which the things, peoples and places collected within the 
archive have an ability of their own to throw us, to move us and, dare I say, to act upon us as if 
agents of their own desires. Thought of in this manner, I cannot think of a more apt term than 
‘politics’ to describe how we might take a collection like The Oddball Archive forward: it captures 
both the urgency and ethics of working with those things that for any number of reasons have found 
themselves as being ‘Other’ to contemporary concerns.  
 
From repression useful things return 
There is a particular, somewhat neglected, early essay by Georges Bataille setting out a rudimentary 
theory of Fascism which I have found particularly enlightening and enabling of an understanding, not 
of its specific subject matter per se, but of a general condition of knowledge lying at the very heart of 
modernity.  
In “The Psychological Structure of Fascism”, Bataille opposes a ‘productive’, bourgeois, element of 
society whose most significant trait was its ‘tendential homogeneity’, with a non-productive element 
of society he described as heterogeneous.1  Although essentially a division concerned with the 
ownership of the means of production, interestingly enough for our purposes, Bataille extends this 
description to include the very structures and formations of post-Enlightenment thought and 
knowledge formation as well. Thus we find, by its very nature, scientific knowledge is allied with the 
homogeneous elements of society: “compelled to note the existence of irreducible facts… the object 
of science is to establish the homogeneity of phenomena”.2 Using the psychoanalytic metaphor of 
the exclusion of the unconscious from the conscious ego, Bataille characterized homogeneous 
scientific knowledge as necessitating the exclusion, not only of the ‘restricted heterogeneous’ 
elements of taboo and mana, but also anything deemed heterogeneous resulting from 
‘unproductive expenditure’: violence, excess, madness - the elements of heterogeneity that surface 
in persons or mobs when the laws of homogeneous society have broken down. 
For Bataille, this exclusion of the heterogeneous from the homogeneous elements of society was 
governed by an active ‘intentionality’ on the part of the bourgeoisie in an effort to maintain control 
over the means of production (hence he often called it ‘censorship’). But if we were to put this 
notion of exclusion alongside Heidegger’s wider epistemological deployment of Husserl’s 
phenomenology of perception and the suggestion that every act of knowledge is necessarily 
accompanied by a simultaneous and unavoidable act of concealment and unknowing, then what we 
begin to approach is, to my mind, an understanding of this process of exclusion as general condition 
of Post-Enlightenment knowledge production itself. Taken in this way, we can suggest an 
homogenizing tendency is inscribed into the very structures of scientific knowledge production at 
the level of discourse which operates above all by the inclusion of certain elements deemed fit and 
worthy of rationality along with a simultaneous exclusion of those elements to be deemed ‘Other’ to 
it. Put another way, we can claim that the structures of post-Enlightenment rationality are as much 
about the suppression of heterogeneous elements as they are of the generation of knowledge 
claims.  
Elsewhere, I have pushed on with Bataille’s psychoanalytic metaphor by characterizing the 
operations of this general condition of post-Enlightenment, scientific, knowledge as being akin to an 
act of repression.3  In doing so I suggested that as much as the Enlightenment may be seen as an 
active campaign for the eradication of other ways of knowing and being that were heterogeneous - 
primarily those which were enchanted, magical and sacred - this eradication, or rather repression, 
was necessarily an incomplete one, and that elements of these other ways of knowing and being not 
only coexist with scientific rationality to this day, but more to the point are constitutive of them in 
their repression. Thus, Curious Visions of Modernity, as that book was called, essentially become an 
effort at unearthing the repressed heterogeneous underbelly of a scientific modernity triumphantly 
pronouncing its own Enlightenment through the homogenizing violences it would unleash across the 
globe. 
Imagine my delight, then, when first rummaging through The Oddball Archives to discover Beth 
McCoy’s stunning recuperation of the FEMA emergency signs in post-Katrina New Orleans as ancient 
sorceries of the law; talismanic signs giving up black bodies and possessions both as a sacrifice to 
ward against the knowledge that many more will be subsumed by the rising tides of capitalism and 
white liberalism’s living death for black people, at the same time as conjuring forth from memory 
the wish of sacrifice as internal reprisal for the humiliation of 9/11. These glyphs FEMA inscribed on 
half submerged properties in New Orleans represent nothing less than, to paraphrase Bataille, 
‘vengeful incursions of the sacred’ upon the supposedly rational surfaces of modernity’s knowledge 
claims. This is indeed a magic of the State. 
Likewise Timothy Sweet’s description of Shawnees, Iroquois and Delaware narratives of the 
‘eradication’ of the Great Buffalo from the lands of the Ohio Valley, as they surfaced in European 
narratives of ‘extinction’ of the Woolly Mammoth, is instructional first and foremost of the ways in 
which such negotiations always happen within the ‘contact zone’ of colonialism: the dismissal of the 
knowledge acts of one system as fanciful ‘myth’, yet a reliance on them as evidence (albeit 
perverted) , followed by an act of translation into the language of rationality, thereby licencing the 
eradication of the original narrative. But more than this, what Sweet’s own excavations unearth is 
the way in which the Enlightenment may have shifted agency from God to ‘Man’ as the knowing 
being, but almost as if in mourning the license which narratives of God-as-agent gave, we moderns 
constantly felt its pull, deploying it in our analyses of breaks in the fossil record, even as we 
denounced as ‘myth’ similar indigenous calls to supernatural agency. Far from being something 
confinable to the early, half-formed fumblings of eighteenth-century science, this pull of agency in 
knowledge production, and recourse to non-human agents, is still very much with us today. 
This is, in effect, part of the important work which The Oddball Archives undertakes for us: to 
demonstrate “that great trove of unreason that nourishes reason’s archive”, as its editors put it4. 
And we can see these unreasonable reasons, occluded visions and less useful efficacies at work right 
throughout the collection - the hoarders, the hoaxers, the Necronauts, the political and philosophical 
thinkers at the edge of what it is to think, and don’t forget the fish-dissecting-movie-makers. In each 
of them we can see the way in which reason operates and how their thoughts, actions, and outputs 
may even be directly in conversation with more reasonable logics and rationales. Yet also there is 
often that some-thing-else, that little bit extra, that excess which tips them over into the not entirely 
reasonable. At the same time there are those who were never part of the cannon of reason and 
rationality, but were always already constituted at its margin as ‘Other’. 
But whereas I am in staunch solidarity with the notion that “we approach oddity and even unreason 
as irremediable elements of all thought”5 - how could I not be with my own narratives of repressed 
heterogeneity lurking in the shadows of scientific knowledge structures? -  I think we need to do 
more than just revel in, document and archive these oddball practitioners, these curious collections 
of things and objects, and these asynchronous synchronicities. One of the provocations of The 
Oddball Archive is the hypothesis that archives of idiosyncratic thinking reveal as much about the 
shape of history as any taxonomy of the works of great minds.6 True enough! However, it could be 
said that they reveal as much, not because their inclusion into discourse through our unearthing of 
them makes a picture more complete - this would in fact be a dangerous proposition. Rather, in 
defining that which cannot be, they mark out the limits and limitations of our knowledges, but more 
to the point, they elucidate the mechanisms through which such knowledge is produced, which is 
itself a marker of interests, struggles, negotiations, betrayals, hijackings and even genocides in the 
worlds which sustain and nurture them. So while I agree we should not dismiss the richness of these 
alternative thinkers, their thoughts, and the worlds they produced merely as offshoots of the 
regressive or self-destructive tendencies within Enlightenment reason; I also think that if we are to 
honour their visions rather than merely domesticate them, then we need to address how it is that 
the label ‘oddball’ may have come to be associated with people who might themselves have thought 
they were anything but; places and things that were once central to the march of rationality and 
reason but suddenly found themselves on the outer; and those whose heterogeneity was marked as 
dangerous, foreign or inhuman from the very beginning.   
Acts of repression are often productive, but very rarely innocently so. What I want to do for the 
purposes of this afterward is to dwell in this lack of innocence as a way of showing how a collection 
like The Oddball Archives should call upon us to be responsive, not just to the pleasures of dabbling 
in the forgotten side-paths of modernity, but also to the analysis of how they have been side-lined in 
the first place and may yet again by our own interactions with them. What I want to do, then, is to 
push into the realm of politics to explore the exclusions and heterogenising tendencies of a 
rationality which still take sustenance in its homogenizing exclusions. To do this I will need to indulge 
in some odd, perhaps even irrational, and certainly excessively, ways… 
 
Remember the guillotine is an instrument of Enlightenment! 
In a scathing rebuke of the sub-discipline of political science known as International Relations, 
Sankaran Krishna characterises the field as being more than just race-blind; he characterises it as 
actively amnesic of the part it plays in the continued maintenance of a racialised status quo.7 Toward 
this end, and in faint echo of Foucault, Krishna zeros in on the political side effects of the academic 
commonplace of abstraction, acknowledging it to be an inescapable analytic device which makes 
knowledge practices possible in the first place, but also as something never innocent of power. In 
the case of International Relations this lack of innocence has a sharp political edge: “IR discourse’s 
valorisation, indeed fetishisation of abstraction is premised on a desire to escape history, to efface 
the violence, genocide and theft that marked the encounter between the rest and the West”.8  In 
this regard, Krishna sees the discipline as being predicated on a number of ‘disciplining’ abstractions:  
the taboo against overly descriptive or historical analysis in favour of theory-building, the reduction 
of social beings to utility-maximisers, the evisceration of violence and its effects through its 
reduction to mere statistics in graphs and tables, the persistence with an archaic system of states 
which discredits imagining non-institutional ways of being, the preservation of hyper-masculine 
insecurities on matters of gender, and the elision of themes such as land theft, racism, slavery and 
colonialism.9 In Krishna’s eyes these otherwise commonplace academic abstractions come to 
constitute the way in which the discipline preserves its own ideology as the legitimate author(ity) of 
academic pronouncements about the International. Krishna is unequivocal in his naming of this 
maintenance of disciplinary self in the face of historic violence and complicity: “Founded as it is on 
discourses that justified, abstracted, and rationalised the genocide of populations of the so-called 
New World, the enslavement of Africans, the colonisation of Asians, the discipline of International 
Relations is one giant strategy of containment”.10 
There are a number of things I find compelling about Krishna’s overtly politicised account, and which 
will eventually help me reveal the political effects of the Oddball. The first is the way in which these 
very specific ‘heterogenising’ tendencies are the direct and inevitable outcome of a key cornerstone 
of rational discourse itself: abstraction - that logic which makes contemporary academic knowledge 
possible in the first place through its ability to draw equivalence and make mobile information for 
comparative purposes. The second, although somewhat incidental, is the way in which Krishna 
grounds this accusation in the replication of the discipline via its everyday pedagogic practices. In 
this case, the way students are encouraged to display their virtuosity in techniques of abstraction, 
and are berated as being ‘too historical’, ‘too descriptive’, ‘not analytic enough’, or ‘lacking in 
intellectual rigour’ should they not. To this we could add any number of additional ‘trainings’ that 
International Relations propagates: the antagonistic and combative argumentation; the masculinist 
valorisation of ‘power politics’ as the only ‘real’ politics and the belief that institutions are the only 
site of such politics; the denigration of personal, local or even internal state politics as somehow 
‘feminine’; the derision of racial politics as something ‘to get over’, so on and so forth. And finally 
what I find captivating about Krishna’s account is the way in which the particular carries with it an air 
of the general: this is not something confined to a ‘problem discipline’ called International Relations 
- in fact in many ways IR is known as an exemplary social science - this is a general condition of the 
Western academy. Yes, the details may differ from institution to institution; discipline to discipline, 
but whether it is politics, economics, history, law, art history, or philosophy there are elements of 
what Krishna has been describing in all of them. 
In essence, what Sankaran Krishna’s account of the disciplining effects of International Relations 
does is call attention to the political ramifications of how our academic disciplines replicate 
themselves, our part as academic agents of that replication, and, more to the point, how this 
replication is not innocent of the maintenance of certain conditions in the world or of a status quo. 
Like any system of knowledge, this they cannot help but do at a purely structural level - 
Enlightenment or otherwise, any system of knowledge will consist of a series of mechanisms for its 
own coherence and replication. By bringing Bataille into conversation with Krishna the suggestion I 
want to make is that the epistemological status of the oddness at the centre of The Oddball Archive 
should be seen not merely as the incidental by-product of Enlightenment rationality, although there 
is no doubt an element of happenstance to it. Rather this oddness is the consequence of an active 
expurgation from an Order of Things by a system of knowledge production which has at is core a 
need to do more than just maintain internal coherence, but actively seek to repudiate and repress 
those other ways of knowing and being that are not its own. This we can see in the excesses of 
Enlightenment rationality. The Enlightenment was an effervescent flowering of knowledge, it was 
the birth of a technique of knowledge production which would enable wondrous invention and 
advance; it would herald the coming of ‘Man’ as the knowing subject and it would bring a globe 
within that subject’s purview through its standardised times and flows, new forms of communication 
and exchange; it would liberate subjects from older forms of subjugation, and it would allow for the 
birth of political communities capable of bringing tens of thousands of subjects under the sway of a 
single flag. And yet we must not forget the excesses of violence, dispossession and destruction which 
came with it.  
 
Toward an odd reflexivity  
If anything of the above account has chimed with the reader then hopefully it is in sounding a word 
of warning regarding our encounter with the heterogeneity of the oddball, and the place we 
academics might yet play in its further domestication and marginalisation.  Precisely because we all 
too often view the oddball as a thing otherwise just existing as curious and off-centred in the world, 
we tend to overlook the ways in which it has been produced as such. And if what Krishna insinuates 
has even a kernel of truth to it, then this domestication can be as much a function of the structures 
and logics of our disciplinary formations as they are of any active negligence on our behalf. We may 
be the most sympathetic of collectors, most nuanced of archivists and skilled of historians, yet still 
be complicit in the erasure of that thing in which we delight and wish to revel.  
Precisely because it is not perfect in this regard, I propose we read The Oddball Archive as a call to 
arms, a call to the kind of reflexivity which would bring recognition of our own positionality and the 
techniques of exclusion and domestication we are inadvertently agents of to the fore of our research 
and writing on the oddball. This is not a romantic and unproblematic call to occupy the space of 
knowledge of ‘the Other’; that is, it is not the suggestion that we may be external to the systems and 
functions of power which bring us as researchers, writers, interested amateurs and aficionados into 
discourse, even as we search at the margins of that discourse for the traces of oddity which enchant 
us so. Rather, what I am intimating is that we might take the work of a book like The Oddball Archive 
forward by focusing on the ethical and political position of working on epistemologically vulnerable 
material from within a system predicated on producing that vulnerability. 
In this manner I am reminded of the early call made by Subaltern Studies scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty 
to a project of history writing he would later describe as ‘Provincializing Europe’. Starting from the 
realisation that, particularly as it is practiced in the institutional site of the university, the act of 
History writing was one which necessarily brought ‘Indian History’ into a position of subalternity to a 
master narrative otherwise known as ‘the History of Europe’, Chakrabarty sought to redress the 
deep collusion between history and the modernising narratives of citizenship and nation (which 
could only ever read Indian histories in terms of lack), with an effort to invert this structural 
positioning of Europe as the referent of all histories by casting it to the provinces of history writing 
itself.11 This was neither a call to reject the rationality of modernity per se, nor was it a call to a 
shallow cultural relativism, or atavistic nativist history. Rather it was an appeal to a history which 
would make visible within the structures of its narrative forms its own repressive strategies and 
practices.12 But in making this appeal Chakrabarty made known the doomed nature of his own 
enterprise: “This is a history that will attempt the impossible: to look toward its own death by 
tracing that which resists and escapes the best human effort at translation across cultural and other 
semiotic systems, so that the world may once again be imagined as radically heterogeneous”.13 
Doomed because of the impossibility of conducting this project within the institutional site of the 
university whose knowledge protocols will always take one back to the terrain where all contours 
follow that of Europe, Chakrabarty nonetheless perseveres. He perseveres because of the political 
and ethical imperative to do so. 
 In pursuit of left-handedness 
The assembly of shadows, the organisation of optical 
phenomena which resist the light, the look of things that 
suggest a face, the depth of bodies that cannot be 
concealed - all these things fall under dark writing’s 
jurisdiction. Like the ground, the meaning of dark writing 
cannot be excavated; it lies in the footstep, the leap and the 
instance between two strides.14 
 
If The Oddball Archive calls to us at the level of being responsible to the ways of knowing and being 
produced by the disciplinary exclusions and homogenising tendencies of our academic abstractions, 
then in what way does it also point toward further work, techniques of investigation, and modes of 
inquiry which might take this political call forward in responsive and responsible ways? 
In the same ‘elsewhere’ I referred to earlier of Curious Visions of Modernity, I attempted to write to 
a series of pre-modern curiosities in as left-handed a way as possible. That is, in a way which 
confounded and frustrated the desire of the right hand to domesticate, to draw equivalence, to 
square the circle, to lock sign and signifier into one-to-one relationships; to write to genre, discipline 
or type. In that instance, the divide between modern and pre-modern, although increasingly blurred 
the further I journeyed, did act as a kind of guide in this venture. So it was to semblance, sympathy 
and similitude that I wrote; my own kind of dark writing.  
But on this occasion two fragments have surfaced from the pages of The Oddball Archive which I 
briefly want to sketch as I see potential in them for the development other left-handed techniques: 
the need to perform, not merely explicate the archive, and the archive-as-agent. 
The need to perform 
In many ways the archives written about in this collection already point us in the direction of new 
modes and techniques of academic inquiry themselves: in their fragmentary and opaque structures, 
in their elusive and unreasonable claims, their oddness unfurls before us like a blueprint to be 
studied, replicated and, above all, performed. Jonathan Eburne’s archive of David Lynch’s ‘kits’ 
neatly shows us this. In the absurdity of Lynch’s Fish Kit - of assembling a living fish from the kit of its 
dissected parts - what comes to the fore is Lynch’s own characterisation of ideas as being tangible 
things, and in this case the thing which is the ‘substance’ or ‘materiality’ of the idea is also a vital and 
animating spirit, both blueprint for action and something in excess of it. It is thus not difficult to see 
Lynch embracing his own eclectic ‘fish kit’ of transcendence edited from his cut-up wanderings 
through world religions as, in essence, this is precisely what he is chasing: the animation, the ‘click, 
click, click’ of film through camera, the vital spirit which sees dead and inanimate things rise again. 
Following on from the Eburne/Lynch Kit we could suggest that metaphor, excess, the uncanny, and 
the heterogeneous are as much techniques to be deployed as they are anything else. One of the all-
too-common dangers of dealing with epistemologically fragile archives is that the archive disappears 
from our work amidst the reams of explication we make of its worth, rather than the archive being 
allowed to surface itself in all its oddness, and disruptive and illusive qualities. Not all of the chapters 
in The Oddball Archives were able to avoid this, but some did with noteworthy skill. 
In the complex interplay of hoax, hoaxer and hoaxed, Judith Roof deftly reveals a two-way (a least) 
operation: for the perpetrator of the hoax, because it is always already a repetition, the triumph of 
originality is rarely there to be had (pleasure is to be derived from the performance of hoaxing 
itself); whereas for the recipient of the hoax, the hoax is already known through its repetition and 
transparency (not that this means people are not willing to be hoaxed). In this way, the play of a 
hoax is nothing less than that of the public secret - that thing which is known but not admitted to in 
everyday discourse. In fact, it is only through its ‘knownness’ that the hoax can even be. But in the 
twists and turns of Roof’s hoaxers and hoaxed, one almost starts to feel a prickle of recognition; the 
recognition which comes with the slow dawning that one is being played, and that ‘played’ here was 
not a dishonesty or failing of argument; rather, it was an uncanny repetition or performance of the 
argument itself, the fulfilment of “desire for the revelation of the representation as sought by the 
mark”.15 
When metaphor is pushed to its limit and breaks, something happens; there is that haemorrhaging 
of a kind of ‘presence’ often associated with the negative labour of defacement. It is an animating 
force which, if performed, can produce curious disruptions and odd disjunctures indeed.  
 
Archive-as-agent 
When the category of ‘man’ heretically ascended to the position of the knowing subject in the early 
modern period, and thereby assumed the power to name of the Adam/Christ figure, something was 
lost - that demiurgic trace written into all things which activated them as agent, not patient of 
knowledge. But in confounding the taxonomic categories of a rationality which structures knowledge 
as an evolving series of named inert things (even if they are actually living things), the oddball, like 
Lynch’s fish kit, often starts to come close to something ‘vital’ in and of itself. How else do we 
explain its pull on us; that immediate flash of recognition when we stumble across it in our research 
travels? It is as if it is not so much that we notice it; it is more like it notices us, beckoning often as 
something jarring and out-of-place, but equally as something to be treasured.  
As someone familiar with the academic writings of a few of the authors assembled in this collection 
it was most interesting to ponder the manner in which many of the chapters had been written. For 
some whose writing I already knew, this project would have been but more of the same of a writerly 
way honed elsewhere. But for others I got the sense of the license which the material itself gave, if 
not demanded. More than just that this is trivial or amusing material which can afford a lighter 
touch, what I sensed with some chapters was a coming-to-terms with a new set of imperatives for 
writing about the thing which somehow seeks to evade or elude our standard academic explications 
with their well-worn structures, so familiar that they announce ‘expertise’ and ‘scholarliness’ well 
before one even reads a single word. In other words, what I sensed was the way in which the 
archives themselves were speaking back, demanding of their authors that they do justice to these 
avoidances and oddities. 
What calls us to an archive, and this is particularly true of the allure of the oddball archive, is the 
power of its ability to throw us, to unsettle, to unnerve, to worry as well as to delight. This power is 
the archive’s vital spirit, generated often precisely because it is at odds with the rationality of its day. 
But it is also this very spirit which is targeted when we innocently enough go about working with our 
archives; working in ways that serve us and our research agendas; working on them so that they can 
be compared, contrasted, qualified, quantified, systematized and temporalized - in a word: 
homogenized. 
Being self-reflexive of the positionality from which one writes carries with it the possibility of 
admitting that other ways of knowing and being are entirely possible. Occupying those ‘other’ 
positionalities may well be beyond our reach, but in striving to be responsible to the objects of our 
research, we may come close to knowing what it is to acknowledge their needs and desires rather 
than always following our own. It is this above all else which The Oddball Archives teaches us.   
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